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NOTES
"HOSTILE LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT:" DEVELOPING
STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY
APPLYING THE HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS TO
CYBERBULLYING
By Carla DiB!asio*
INTRODUCTION

Lindsey is a sixteen-year-old sophomore who logs onto her Facebook1 page once she gets home from school. Lindsey updates her status and writes on her Facebook wall, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever
talk to that cow, just tell her MOO." Katie is a fourteen-year-old
eighth grade student at the same school. She decides to update her
Facebook status after school and writes, "In case you didn't already
know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to hell." Are these
instances where Lindsey and Katie are protected by their First
Amendment free speech rights? Or, may their public school district
punish them for their cyber speech?
* J.D. candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Associate Coordinator, Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet; President, International Law Society. I offer special thanks to my sister, Christina DiBlasio, whose
incredible strength and integrity helped to inspire the topic of this Note. I would like
to extend additional thanks to a mentor, Beth Rankin, who always inspires grammatical diligence and academic excellence.
1
Facebook is a social networking website that is operated and privately
owned by Facebook, Inc. In addition to other functions, users may create a personal
profile, add other users as friends, exchange messages, and join common interest
groups. As of December 2011, Facebook has more than 845 million active users,
which is about one person for every eight in the world. See Facebook Fact Sheet, at
http://www.facebook.com/press/info. php ?factsheet.
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As the use of social media, and the attendant cyberbullying, becomes increasingly prevalent, high school officials will struggle to
determine if they can sanction their students for making similar comments without infringing their students' free speech rights. 2 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court cases that deal with student free speech
rights leave lower courts and school districts ill-equipped to cope with
the ever-increasing problem of off-campus speech in the form of
cyberbullying.
This Note explores the scope of a student's right to free "cyber
speech" on social networking websites. Part I defines cyberbullying
and illustrates that it is an emerging problem confronting today's
schools. Part II examines the Supreme Court cases dealing with student free speech rights, known as the "Tinker Tetralogy," and discusses why that precedent has a limited application to cyberbullying. Part
III explains that a new test is needed so that schools and courts alike
can effectively protect victims of cyberbullying, while still protecting
student speech that does not target victims. Part IV explains that the
hostile work environment analysis used in Title VII employment discrimination cases and the sexual harassment analysis used in Title IX
education cases provide a useful starting point for a new cyberbullying test. Part V outlines this Note's proposed test, which incorporates
the four-factor analysis set forth in Title VII's hostile work environment claims and draws on similarities between the workplace and the
classroom. Part VI explains how the test is applied and illustrates that
this test operates like a sliding scale and is flexible enough to deal
with the constant evolution of cyberspace and cyberbulling.
Ultimately, this test will enable schools to discern the level of
perniciousness of the cyber speech to determine whether the speech
rises to the level of "cyberbullying," such that school action is justified and, indeed, required. In other words, this test helps schools and
courts discover the point at which a student's right to free speech
transgresses a student's right to be protected from cyberbullying and a
hostile learning environment. It is at this point that a school has the
duty to limit the cyberbully's speech and protect the victim of cyberbullying.3
2

Teens and Cyberbullying: An Executive Summary on a Report on Research, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/Teens%20and%20Cyberbullying%2
0Research%20Study.pdf (Teens aged 13 to 17 are a growing online population. Their
access to these electronic communication tools is present in many settings: at home, at
school, at friends' houses, and even at public libraries and WiFi sites).
3
The school's duty to intervene assumes that the school has actual
knowledge of the speech.
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I. CYBERBULLYING: A GROWING PROBLEM

Cyberbullying is online abuse that involves juveniles and students. 4 Cyberbullying is increasingly prevalent in today's schools and
involves nearly half of U.S. teens. 5 The incidence of cyberbullying is
higher among females than males and is most rampant among fifteenand sixteen-year-olds. 6 While there are multiple definitions of the
term, cyberbullying is typically described as intentional harm inflicted
through electronic media. 7 Cyberbullying involves tormenting, threatening, harassing, humiliating, embarrassing or otherwise targeting a
victim. 8 It is often motivated by prejudice and hate; indeed, some of
the most serious cases are the result of bias towards the victim's race,
religion, national origin, gender identity, or sexual orientation. 9
Cyberbullying is a new form of harassment taking place within
new forms of Internet-based technology. 10 It is instantaneous and its
reach is potentially unlimited. 11 Anyone can join in with the simple
4

Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1103, 1108 (2011 ). However, it is possible that in any given instance of cyberbullying, at least one of the parties may not be a youth. Id. at 1108-09.
5
NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2 (detailing that more
than four in ten teens, ages thirteen to seventeen, report that they have experienced
some form of cyberbullying in the last year). See also Bullying/Cyberbullying Prevention Law: Model Statute and Advocacy Toolkit, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Apr.
2009), http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/Anti-Bullying%20Law%20Toolkit_2009.pdf;
Interview with Jill Rembrandt, Associate Project Director of the Anti-Defamation
League in the Ohio, Kentucky and Allegheny Region (Feb. 2011).
6
NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
Lipton, supra note 4 at 1109.
9
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra, note 5, at 1. This supports the application of Title VII because Title VII is intended to protect against discrimination based
on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2011).
10
According to the Associate Project Director of the Anti-Defamation
League in the Ohio, Kentucky and Allegheny Region, there are at least thirty-five
different websites where cyberbullying frequently takes place. Interview with Jill
Rembrandt, supra note 5. Furthermore, cyberbullying and Internet harassment are
pervasive threats. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1, 4-5 (noting that
in a 2007 survey of thirteen- to seventeen-year-olds, thirty-five percent of those surveyed reported being harassed over the internet within the last year).
11
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1.
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click of a mouse. 12 Messages and pictures on the Internet are potentially more disruptive than messages sent by traditional media because
the Internet provides for the widespread distribution of information to
an unlimited audience in a very short amount of time. 13 As a result,
the impact on the victim can be more severe, and, its effects more
profound.
The impact of cyberbullying is well documented. Studies show
that "difficulty making friends, loneliness, low self-esteem, depression, poor academic achievement, truancy and suicide are all associated with being bullied." 14 Teenage victims report experiencing a wide
array of emotions-ranging from anger to embarrassment to fear-as
a result of cyberbullying. 15 Students need special protection from
cyberbullying because online abuse quite simply affects children more
drastically than adults. 16
Public outcry over cyberbullying skyrocketed in recent years as
major media outlets broadcasted stories about the tragic suicides of
teenagers who endured cyberbullying. Take, for example, Tyler
Clementi, a freshman at Rutgers University. 17 After learning that his
roommate secretly filmed and broadcasted a video of a sexual encounter he had with another male student, Tyler posted the following

statement on his Facebook wall: "Jumping off the gw bridge sorry." 18
19
Shortly thereafter, he did.
Or, take the tragic tale of Megan Meier. After creating a Myspace
account, Megan became online friends with "Josh Evans," 20 a fake
local sixteen year-old boy created by a classmate and her mother. 21
Megan and "Josh" quickly established an online relationship, but the
friendship turned sour about a month later. "Josh" claimed he no
longer wanted to be friends with Megan after hearing rumors about
her, and he told Megan that the world would be better off without
her. 22 Soon thereafter, several other students joined in and posted in
electronic bulletins that "Megan Meir is a slut" and "Megan Meier is
fat." 23 Devastated by the online abuse, Megan wrote that Josh was
"the kind of boy a girl would kill herself over." 24 Megan hung herself
in her bedroom closet a few hours later. 25
II. THE TINKER TETRALOGY 26 HAS LIMITED
APPLICATION
In order to address cyberbullying, it is important to assess what is
"protected" versus "unprotected" speech under the First Amendment. 27 Categories of unprotected speech include: true threats, 28
18

12

See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1 (outlining how
cyberbullying "can rapidly swell as ... others join in on 'the fun' "); Marlene Sandstrom, More Insidious Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/091301cyberbullying-and-a-studentssuicide/more-insidious-harassment (describing the "insidious" nature of cyberbullying); Drew Jackson, How is Cyberbullying Different than Traditional Bullying,
CYBERBULLYING (Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.slais.ubc.ca/courses/libr500/04-05wt2/www/D_Jackson/traditional.htm (describing how a bully can send an email "to
their entire class or school with a few clicks").
13
See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009) ("An
email can be sent to dozens or hundreds of other students by hitting 'send.' A blog
entry ... can be instantaneously viewed by students, teachers, and administrators
alike. Off-campus speech can become on-campus speech with the click of a mouse.").
14
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1. See also Lipton, supra
note 4, at 1104-05 (explaining some instances of online abuse result in severe emotional distress and sometimes physical violence or death).
15
See NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2.0ver half of
cyberbully victims report feeling angry (56%); one-third report feeling hurt (33%); a
third report being embarrassed (32%), and one in eight said they felt scared (13%).
16
Lipton, supra note 4, at 1105-06 (discussing how cyberbullying dispropor·
tionately affects disempowered groups).
17
Emily Friedman, Victim ofSecret Dorm Sex Tape Posts Facebook Goodbye, Jumps to His Death, ABCNEvvs&p.-.29,20101http://abcnews.go.com/US/victimsecret-dorm-sex-tape-commits-suicide/story?id= 11758716.
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Friedman, supra note 17.
Id.
In reality, there was no Josh Evans. Rather, one of Megan's former friends
and her mother created the "Josh Evans" profile on Myspace after the friendship
between the two girls turned sour. Parents: Cyberbullying Led to Teen 's Suicide,
ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA (Nov. 19, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3 882520.
21
ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA, supra note 20; see also Gordon
Tokumatsu & Jonathan Lloyd, MySpace Case: "You 're the Kind ofBoy a Girl Would
Kill Herself Over,", NBCBAY AREA(Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Woman-Testifies-About-Final-MessageSent-to-Teen.html.
22
Tokumatsu, supra note 21.
23
ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA, supra note 20.
24
Tokumatsu, supra note 21.
25 Id.
26
The Tinker Tetralogy refers to four U.S. Supreme Court cases, beginning
with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Three additional U.S. Supreme Court cases complete the Tinker tetralogy. Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See Benjamin L. Ellison, More
Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with On-Campus Impact, 85
NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 809, 819 n.67 (2010) ("With the addition of Morse, the Tinker
trilogy becomes a tetralogy, from the Greek prefix tetra- meaning 'four."')
27
The First Amendment states, in part, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const. amend. I.
t9
20
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fighting words, 29 incitement, 30 and obscenity. 31 Courts further label
some speech as unprotected because they consider it "without value,
not advancing political discussion, unnecessary in form to communicate ideas, or a combination of these." 32 Schools may punish oncampus speech falling into these unprotected categories, and in addition, may even restrict speech that goes beyond these categories. 33
U.S. Supreme Court precedent over the past 40 years establishes
that public school students retain the First Amendment right to free
speech while at school. 34 That right, however, is more limited than
speech rights in a public forum because schools retain an interest in
maintaining an orderly and productive learning environment. 35 Rather,
"[t]he constitutional rights of students in public schools are not auto36
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
28

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)("The first
amendment does not protect violence."); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707
(1969) (per curiam) (noting that true threats are not constitutionally protected speech).
29
Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942)(classifying
speech directed at another and likely to provoke a violent response as unprotected).
30
Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (classifying
speech that incites imminent lawless action as unprotected).
31
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (stating that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
32
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (articulating that some speech is "clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
33
Ellison, supra note 26, at 812 (The Tinker Tetralogy "establish[es] that a
student's constitutional right to freedom of expression gives way to the school's interests in education, order, and discipline ifthe expression is substantially disruptive,
plainly offensive, perceived to be school sponsored expression, or understood to
advocate illegal drug use.").
34
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915,
926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
35
Conditions in the school environment potentially justify constraining student speech since:
[S]tudents and teachers cannot easily disassociate themselves from expressions directed towards them on school property and during school hours, because disciplinary
problems in such a populated and concentrated setting seriously sap the educational
processes, and because high school teachers and administrators have the vital responsibility of compressing a variety of subjects and activities into a relatively confined
period of time and space ....
Shanleyv. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
Tinkerv. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969);
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Such discussion provides further support of the
position adopted in this Note, such that schools have the duty to step in and limit
speech when it creates a hostile learning environment.
36
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 406
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)) ( "[T] he
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school."). See also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("It is evident that the school setting re-
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Students' rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. " 37 As a result, student speech rights
under the First Amendment have developed separately from the more
general First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence. 38 Tinker is the
Supreme Court's first attempt to define students' free speech rights in
schools. Tinker and three subsequent student speech cases, collectively known as the Tinker tetralogy, address instances involving students' free speech rights.
A. The Starting Line: The Tinker Standard
Tinker dealt with a small group of high school and middle school
students who wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam
War. The school issued a warning that students wearing armbands on
school grounds would face suspension. 39 Several students wore arm. bands anyway and the school suspended them in accordance with
school policy. 40 The students subsequently brought a civil action
against the school for infringing on their First Amendment rights. 41
The district court upheld the school sanction as reasonable in order to
ensure school discipline. 42 The Eighth Circuit-hearing the case en
bane-was evenly divided, so the lower court's decision was affirmed
without opinion. 43 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari. 44
The Supreme Court began its opinion by famously stating: "It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate. " 45 Yet, "the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 46

quires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject."); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 ("Fourth Amendment rights, no less
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than
elsewhere .... ").
37
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
38
See infra notes 39-89 and accompanying text.
39
Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
4o Id.
41 Id.
42
Id. at 504-05.
43
Id.at 505.
44 Id.
45
Id. at 506.
46
Id. at 507
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that public school students retain the First Amendment right to free
speech while at school. 34 That right, however, is more limited than
speech rights in a public forum because schools retain an interest in
maintaining an orderly and productive learning environment. 35 Rather,
"[t]he constitutional rights of students in public schools are not auto36
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
28

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)("The first
amendment does not protect violence."); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707
(1969) (per curiam) (noting that true threats are not constitutionally protected speech).
29
Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942)(classifying
speech directed at another and likely to provoke a violent response as unprotected).
30
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (classifying
speech that incites imminent lawless action as unprotected).
31
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (stating that "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
32
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (articulating that some speech is "clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
33
Ellison, supra note 26, at 812 (The Tinker Tetralogy "establish[es] that a
student's constitutional right to freedom of expression gives way to the school's interests in education, order, and discipline if the expression is substantially disruptive,
plainly offensive, perceived to be school sponsored expression, or understood to
advocate illegal drug use.").
34
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915,
926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
35
Conditions in the school environment potentially justify constraining student speech since:
[S]tudents and teachers cannot easily disassociate themselves from expressions directed towards them on school property and during school hours, because disciplinary
problems in such a populated and concentrated setting seriously sap the educational
processes, and because high school teachers and administrators have the vital responsibility of compressing a variety of subjects and activities into a relatively confined
period of time and space ....
Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969);
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Such discussion provides further support of the
position adopted in this Note, such that schools have the duty to step in and limit
speech when it creates a hostile learning environment.
36
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 406
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)) ( "[T] he
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school."). See also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("It is evident that the school setting re-
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Students' rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. " 37 As a result, student speech rights
under the First Amendment have developed separately from the more
general First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence. 38 Tinker is the
Supreme Court's first attempt to define students' free speech rights in
schools. Tinker and three subsequent student speech cases, collectively known as the Tinker tetralogy, address instances involving students' free speech rights.
A. The Starting Line: The Tinker Standard
Tinker dealt with a small group of high school and middle school
students who wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam
War. The school issued a warning that students wearing armbands on
school grounds would face suspension. 39 Several students wore arm. bands anyway and the school suspended them in accordance with
school policy. 40 The students subsequently brought a civil action
against the school for infringing on their First Amendment rights. 41
The district court upheld the school sanction as reasonable in order to
ensure school discipline. 42 The Eighth Circuit-hearing the case en
bane-was evenly divided, so the lower court's decision was affirmed
without opinion. 43 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari. 44
The Supreme Court began its opinion by famously stating: "It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." 45 Yet, "the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 46

quires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject."); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 ("Fourth Amendment rights, no less
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than
elsewhere .... ").
37
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
38
See infra notes 39-89 and accompanying text.
39
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42
Id. at 504-05.
43
Id.at 505.
44 Id.
45
Id. at 506.
46
Id. at 507
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Thus, the Court observed that in order to limit a student's expression, the State47 must show that the prohibition of a particular expression was caused by something more than the desire to avoid the dis48
comfort associated with an unpopular viewpoint. The Court did not
find that students wearing armbands would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school," 49 nor did the Court find that there was any
reasonable forecast of such disturbance. 50 Accordingly, the school's
51
disciplinary actions violated the students' First Amendment rights.
B. The Tinker Tetralogy & the Narrowing Scope of Protected
Student Speech
While Tinker purportedly offered broad protection of student free
speech rights by requiring a material and substantial disruption before
school interference was justified, the Supreme Court considerably
narrowed that protection in three subsequent cases. The three landmark cases did not overrule Tinker, but they explained that a school
has the authority to limit student speech beyond the substantial interference criteria set forth in Tinker. In Bethel School District No. 403 v.
53
Fraser, 52 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v.
Frederick, 54 the Supreme Court examined when speech constitutes a
substantial disruption and when controversial speech occurs under the
auspices of a school-sponsored activity.
1. Fraser: No Protection for Crude Speech
In 1983, Bethel School District suspended Matthew Fraser before
his high school graduation because he used several graphic sexual
comments and metaphors in a speech nominating a classmate for a
student-elected office at a school assembly. 55 Fraser was disciplined
47

The "State" being referred to by the Court is the "State in the person of
school officials." Id. at 509.
48
Id. at 509.
49
Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
50
Id. at 514.
51
"In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionality valid reasons to
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
52
478 U.S. 675 (1986)
53
484 U.S. 260 (1987)
54
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
55

Fraser's entire speech was:
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for violating a school rule prohibiting "[c]onduct which materially and
substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the
use of obscene, profane language or gestures." 56 Deferring to school
officials, the Court upheld Fraser's sanction. The Court explained that
the school remains a place where order, discipline, and inculcation of
values must be maintained. 57
The Supreme Court noted that many students, especially girls and
younger listeners, were likely shocked and offended by the speech. 58
The Court proclaimed that "schools, as instruments of the state, may
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be
conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech
and conduct .... " 59
Under Fraser, schools have broader rights to determine what is
appropriate behavior and speech. 60 Subsequent rulings make clear that
the holding in Fraser relied on a different mode of analysis than Tink61
er. Fraser did not rely on the substantial disruption test prescribed
by Tinker; rather, the decision in Fraser rested on the "vulgar,"

I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm--but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally--he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vicepresident--he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986).
56
Id. at 678.
57
Id. at 681 ("[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government
in the community and the nation.") (alteration in original) (quoting C. BEARD & M.
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
58
Id. at 683-84 ("The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of
awareness of human sexuality.").
59
Id. at 683.
60
Id. at 682 ("[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.") (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985). Years later, the Morse Court explained
that Fraser's First Amendment rights were circumscribed "in light of the special characteristics of the school environment." Morse v. Frederick 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
61
Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 ("Fraser established that Tinker's analysis is not
absolute. Whatever approach Fraser employed, it was not the 'substantial disruption'
analysis prescribed by Tinker.").
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"lewd," and "plainly offensive" character of the speech and its negative impact on school's educational environment. 62
2. Hazelwood: Control Over Pedagogical Concerns
In Hazelwood, students involved in a high school journalism class
filed suit alleging violation of their freedom of speech rights after
their school principal did not allow publication of articles dealing with
divorce and teen pregnancy in the school newspaper. 63 The principal
asserted that the material was inappropriate for younger students and
compromised students' privacy, even though the articles used fictitious names. 64 Relying on the test from Tinker, the court of appeals
found no evidence of a material disruption to class work or school
discipline. 65 Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
schools have broad discretion to limit student speech in school. . . 66
sponsored act1v1tles.
The Court noted that the school exercised a significant amount of
control over its student newspapers and therefore concluded that the
newspaper was part of the school's curriculum. 67 The students were
under the supervision of a teacher and the paper was funded entirely
by the school. 68 The Supreme Court upheld the school's actions because "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored activities as long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concems." 69
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during the Olympic Torch Relay that passed through his hometown in
Alaska. 7 Frederick's principal was concerned that bystanders might
interpret the banner as advocating illegal drug use, so he confiscated
the banner and suspended Frederick. 71
Although the students were gathered off-campus and across the
street from the school, the Court considered the rally a schoolsponsored event because school officials were interspersed among the
students and monitored the students at the rally. 72 To buttress the
holding, the Court cited statistical evidence about the serious drug
problem among the Nation's youth. 73 Accordingly, the Court concluded that schools may take steps to "safeguard those entrusted to
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging
illegal drug use." 74 Thus, the school did not violate Frederick's constitutional rights because schools have an acute interest in deterring student drug use. 75
One frustrating aspect of the Tinker tetralogy is that the Court has
not yet provided a workable test for determining the extent of a
school's authority over off-campus student speech. 76 Even so, the
Morse decision dealing with off-campus speech provides the closest
indication of how the Court might analyze cyber speech, which similarly occurs off-campus. 77

°

C. The Limitations of the Tinker Tetralogy

The Tinker tetralogy sets forth a number of factors to consider
when analyzing whether a school can restrict student speech. The

3. Morse: No Protection for Speech Related to Illegal
Drug Use
70

Prior to the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, a high school
student, Joseph Frederick, displayed a fourteen-foot banner proclaiming "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" across the street from his high school
62

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988).
63
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988).
64
Id. at 263. The article dealing with pregnancy discussed sexual activities
and birth control, whereas the article dealing with divorce contained sensitive details
of the subject student's home life. Id.
65
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (1986), rev'd,
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
66
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
67
Id. at 263, 268.
68 Id.
69
Id. at 273.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007).
Id. at 398.
72
Id. at 400-01. Additionally, the rally took place during school hours, the
school band and cheerleaders performed, and Frederick's banner was oriented so
students could view it. Id. at 401.
73
Id. at 408 ( "Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the
health and well-being of young people .... The problem remains serious today.
About half of American 12th graders have used an illicit drug, as have more than a
third of 10th graders and about one-fifth of 8th graders .... Some 25% of high
schoolers say they have been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property
within the past year.") (citations omitted).
74
Id.at 397.
75
Id. at 397.
76
Id. at 401.
77
See Morse, 551U.S.·393. The Court did not decide this issue in Morse,
and subsequently declined to clarify the issue. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132
S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (denying certiorari); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct.
1095 (2012) (denying certiorari); Wisniewski v. Bd. ofEduc., 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008)
(denying certiorari).
71
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general framework provided by the Tinker tetralogy considers whether
the speech: a) poses a substantial disruption; 78 b) is lewd or offensive
to the young audience in the school setting; 79 c) takes place during a
school-sponsored activity or is connected to a pedagogical purpose; 80
or d) promotes negative behavior such as illegal drug use. 81 The application of these factors has led to some inconsistencies among lower
courts analyzing student cyber-speech cases. 82 Indeed, in Morse, Justice Breyer described the lack of clear guidance given to courts about
the regulation of student speech:
In some instances, it is appropriate to decide a constitutional
issue in order to provide "guidance" for the future. But I
cannot find much guidance in today's decision.... Beyond
"steps" that prohibit the unfurling of banners at school outings, the Court does not explain just what those "restrict[ions]" or those "steps" might be. 83
Justice Thomas also warned about such ambiguity in the Court's
·present view on student speech:
[W]e continue to distance ourselves from Tinker, but"we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates

and when it does not. I am afraid that our jurisprudence now
says that students have a right to speak in schools except
when they do not-a standard continuously developed
through litigation against local schools and their administra84
tors.
Providing even greater uncertainty is the fact that cyberbullying
presents a new category of "cyber speech" that takes place in a forum
never fully addressed by the Supreme Court. 85 Indeed, it is not even
clear whether speech existing in cyber space may be considered
speech within the schoolhouse gates since that determination remains
subject to a highly fact-based analysis. 86 Many circuit courts directly
apply the Tinker substantial disruption test without considering
whether the speech took place on or off campus. 87 The Third Circuit
explained, "we hold that off-campus speech that causes or reasonably
threatens to cause a substantial disruption . . . with a school need not
satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant
to Tinker." 88 Yet some circuit courts, primarily the Second Circuit,
have considered the location of the speech as an important threshold
issue that courts must resolve before applying any student speech
analysis derived from Supreme Court precedent. 89
84

78

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79
See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
80
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
81
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
82
See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (advocating that Tinker does not apply
to off-campus speech "and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in
off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community
at large."); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 258 (3d
Cir. 2010) (adopting a multi-factored "nexus test" requiring the school to demonstrate
a sufficient nexus between the student's speech and a substantial disruption of the
school environment); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir.
2006) ("[There are] three categories of speech that school officials may constitutionally regulate, each of which is governed by different Supreme Court precedent: (1)
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by [Fraser]; (2)
school-sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into
neither of these categories is governed by Tinker."); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Thomas v. Bd. ofEduc., 607 F.2d 1043,
1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding Tinker and it's progeny inapplicable because "all but an
insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was deliberately designed to take
place beyond the schoolhouse gate."); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch.
Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (using a hybrid test examining
whether there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of future substantial disruption).
83
Morse, 551 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (alteration in original).

275

Id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03
("The Supreme Court has yet to address the factual situation at hand-whether a
school can regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside the school gates,
and is not connected to a school-sponsored event, but that subsequently makes its
ways onto campus, either by the speaker or by other means.").
86
See e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865, 869 (Pa.
2002) (The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed whether a student's websitewhich was allegedly violent and derogatory about school officials-was on-campus
or off-campus speech. The court concluded that there was a "sufficient nexus" between the website and the school campus to warrant application of the substantial
disruption test from Tinker because J.S. had accessed the website during class and
informed other students about it. Moreover, school officials were the subject of the
website.).
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LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying the substantial disruption test to a violent poem written at home and brought
into school, without regard to the location where the speech originated); Shanley v.
Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Tinker where
student-created underground newspapers were created and distributed entirely offcampus but turned up on campus). See also Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 82728 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an underground newspaper distributed at school).
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J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir.
2010).
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See e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F .3d 41, 50 (2d. Cir. 2008) (A student,
Avery, sent an email to students and parents and posted a message on her personal
blog criticizing the school for cancelling a school event and encouraging recipients to
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See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79
See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
80
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
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See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
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2006) ("[There are] three categories of speech that school officials may constitutionally regulate, each of which is governed by different Supreme Court precedent: (1)
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by [Fraser]; (2)
school-sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into
neither of these categories is governed by Tinker."); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
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Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (using a hybrid test examining
whether there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of future substantial disruption).
83
Morse, 551 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (alteration in original).
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Cyberbullying presents a host of modem challenges that have not
yet been raised in the student speech cases considered by the Supreme
Court. Cyberbullying is harassment directed at a particular victim
rather than expression of a political belief. Cyberbullying does not
involve generalized sexual innuendos, school newspaper articles about
fictitious people, or a vague statement alluding to illegal drug use.
Cyberbullying does not typically take place on school grounds or during school-sponsored activities. Rather, cyber speech occurs over
email, on a student's Facebook wall, in a "tweet," and in countless
electronic bulletin boards and chat rooms. Courts must modernize the
Tinker tetralogy' s method of analysis to deal with the very real problem that cyber speech poses to schools today. As discussed below,
courts need additional interpretative tools to address the unique category of cyber speech.
ID. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST: CYBERBULLYING
REQUIRES PROTECTION OF STUDENT VICTIMS
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cyberbullying, the educational environment should, in tum, improve
for all students.
In order to effectively quarantine cyberbullying, any proposed test
must promote a reasonably expedient process for determining when
school intervention is justified. This Note's proposed test diverges
from the Tinker tetralogy' s focus on disruption to the school as a
whole and instead focuses on the individual victim's learning environment. This new approach incentivizes school officials into take
prompt, corrective action, rather than sitting idly by as cyberbullying
continues to escalate.
Because this proposed test focuses on the victim's individual
learning environment, Title VII' s hostile working environment standard, which also focuses on the individual, provides an apt analogy
and, thus, a useful starting point. As explained below, the hostile work
environment analysis translates well into this Note's proposed hostile
learning environment test.
B. Children Need More Protection than Adults.

A. Cyberbullying is Targeted Abuse
Cyberbullying is verbal assault. It is directed at specific, identifiable victims. A school's decision to prohibit speech that rises to the
level of cyberbullying is, as Tinker requires, "caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid discomfort ... [associated with] an
unpopular viewpoint." 90 It is caused by the desire to protect victims
from harassment and humiliation, 91 thereby promoting a productive
learning environment.
In order to effectively address cyberbullying in schools, courts
and school officials need to shift their focus away from looking solely
for a material and substantial interference within the operation of the
school. Instead, the focus should be on identifying a material and substantial interference in the educational environment of the targeted
victim. The school's main goal in addressing cyberbullying should be
protecting the victim. If the school successfully protects students from

A child should be protected from a hostile learning environment,
just as adults are protected from hostile working environments. Because children are more vulnerable and susceptible to online harassment than adults, this Note argues that a child's learning environment
deserves greater protection than an adult's working environment. This
is not a novel idea. Minors have traditionally received more protection
on the Internet than adults. In recent years, Congress passed legislation protecting children from various online threats, including the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA") 92 and the Internet Safety Act contained in Title VII of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. 93
Cyberbullying poses greater risks for minors than adults. Studies
have found that one-third to one-half of adolescents struggle with low
self-esteem, especially in early adolescence. 94 Additionally, "the aver92

contact school officials. The Court explained it was reasonably foreseeable that
A very' s message would reach the school campus because the message was designed
to reach campus by encouraging readers to contact the school). See also Wisniewski
v. Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering the nexus between a student's AOL Instant Messaging and the school's campus and holding that it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent
icon contained within an Instant Message would reach the school property).
90
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
91
See supra notes 4-25 and accompanying text (highlighting the possible bad
results of unchecked cyberbullying).

Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000)
(protecting online personal information from children under thirteen years of age
collected or stored by persons or entities under U.S. jurisdiction).
93
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42 U.S.C.)
(protecting children from sexual predators on the Internet, child exploitation online,
and words or images harmful to children on the Internet).
94
Act for Youth Upstate Center of Excellence: Cornell University, University of Rochester & New York State Center for School Safety, Research Facts and
Findings: Adolescent Self-Esteem (June 2003),
http://www.actforyouth.net/resources/rf/rf_ slfestm_ 0603 .pdf.
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age adolescent is less responsible [during decision-making], more
myopic, and less temperate than the average adult." 95 "Children and
adolescents often desperately seek the affirmation and approval by
their peers," and they commonly experience "emotional, psychological, and behavioral ill effects" when they perceive themselves to be
socially rejected. 96 Cyberbullying is anecdotally and empirically
linked to maladaptive emotional, psychological, developmental, and
behavioral consequences, including delinquency and school violence. 97
C. The Current Law is Failing Our Youth
In response to this new form of bullying and its potentially drastic
consequences, roughly 30 states have included electronic forms of
harassment in their anti-bullying statutes. 98 In 2008, the House of
Representatives introduced the Megan Meier Cyber Bullying Prevention Act, 99 but the proposed federal legislation failed to pass because
its language 100 was unclear and overly broad. IOI Twenty states have

95
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity ofJudgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents may be less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. Sci. &
L., 741, 757 (2000).
96
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Offiine Consequences of Online
Victimization: School Violence and Delinquency, 6(3) J. SCH. VIOLENCE 89, 95
(2007).
97
Id. at 103, 108 (After compiling data from over 1,300 Internet-using adolescents, the authors noted "the emotional and psychological costs of cyberbullying
victimization and empirically linked cyberbullying victimization with oftline delinquent and deviant behavior").
98
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief
Review ofState Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH
CENTER (July 2010),
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws_20100701.pdf; see
also BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last updated Jan. 2012).
99
Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 1 lOth Cong. (2d
Sess. 2008). The Act was ultimately referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security on July 28, 2008, where it remains. Bill Summary
& Status: llOth Congress (2007 - 2008), HR.6123, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl lO:h.r.06123: (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
100
"Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication,
with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to
a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." H.R.
6123 § 3.
101
See Steven Kotler, Cyberbullying Bill Could Ensnare Free Speech Rights,
FoxNEWS.COM (May 14, 2009),
http ://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/14/cyberbullying-ensnare-free-speech-
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enacted statutes containing provisions that require school districts to
adopt anti-cyberbullying policies. I 02 However, many of these statutes
"do not adequately guide schools regarding when they have jurisdiction over students' online activity." 103 In order to effectively address
cyberbullying in schools, school officials need clarity on the boundaries of their authority over cyber speech occurring off school grounds.
IV. DEVELOPING A TEST FROM AN EXCELLENT
STARTING POINT: TITLE VII AND TITLE IX

A. Title VII: Hostile Work Environment Translates into Hostile School Environment

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers discrimination by
an employer against "any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 104 Hostile work environment law was initially developed under Title VII to
address sexual harassment cases. 105 Under the hostile work environment analysis, Title VII is violated "[w]hen a workplace is so permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,i 06 that is

rights/ (noting that the bill could seemingly apply in many contexts for which it was
not intended).
102
See John 0. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student
Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 95 (2011) (citing ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-18514(e) (West 2011); CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 32261 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4112D(b)(2) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4) (West 2012); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b)(l) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 280.28(3) (West 2011);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(b) (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., Educ. § 7-424.l(b)(l)
. (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370(d) (West 2011); MINN. STAT.
ANN.§ 121A.0695 (West 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 160.775 (West 2011); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 79-2,137(3) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 193-F:4(II) (2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § l 8A:3 7-15 (West 2011 ); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.4
(West 2011); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 339.356 (West 2011); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.1303.1-A (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 16-21-24 (West 2011); S.C. CODE
ANN.§ 59-63-140(2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A.300.285(2) (West2011)).
103
Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for
Public School Jurisdiction Over Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563,
1566 (2009).
104
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII,§ 703, 78 Stat.
255 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2012)).
105
See generally Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
106
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
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'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of victim's em. working envrronmen
.
t . ,,,107
p 1oyment and create an abus1ve
Hostile work environment case law presents a well-accepted and
well-defined standard that is useful in addressing issues of free speech
in cyberbullying cases. Adults seek protection from unwelcome harassment and bullying that interferes with their work environment.
Likewise, students should be free from unwelcome harassment and
bullying that interferes with their learning environment. Though
cyberbullying may not dovetail precisely with the discrimination prohibited by Title VII hostile work environment law, cyberbullying is
often just as pernicious as the discrimination addressed in Title VII
and it presents a definite form of harm that is developmentally harmful to minors. Cyberbully laws and Title VII share an interest in protecting individuals from discriminatory or abusive conduct.
The Supreme Court has enumerated a list of factors to consider
when determining whether a workplace is sufficiently hostile to support a harassment claim under Title VII: a) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 108 b) the severity of the conduct; c) the nature of
the conduct and whether it was unwelcome; and d) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance. 109
These factors have parallels in the school environment. Although
an employer's ability to sanction an employee for harassment in the
workplace is different from a school's authority to sanction a student
for cyberbullying, the underlying premise-protecting an individualremains the same. 110 An employee 'will perform better and advance
more easily ifthe employee-·can work in an environment that is free of
harassment and discrimination. Similarly, a student will perform and
learn better in a school environment that is free of bullying.
For example, a worker who feels discriminated against may not
contribute as readily to a discussion in a meeting; likewise, a student
107

Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67

(1986)).
108

The frequency of the discriminatory conduct is also referred to as "perva-

siveness."
109
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Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (listing factors that help determine whether the
workplace is sufficiently hostile or abusive to support a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
110
Title VII protects against discrimination with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l ). Protection from cyberbullying closely tracks the intended result of Title VII because many victims of
cyberbullying are singled out for the same reasons. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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who feels discriminated against may be less likely to raise his hand in
class. An employee may decide to call off work to avoid harassment,
just as a student may be reluctant to attend school so as to avoid suffering humiliation. Even when cyberbullying occurs entirely outside
school grounds, empirical data confrrms that children feel the repercussions of cyberbullying at school. 111 Thus, the rationale for applying
Title VII' s framework should apply regardless of where the speech is
made.
B. The Supreme Court Already Incorporated the Hostile
Work Environment Analysis in Determining School Liability under Title IX.
Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments in 1972
to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance in order to help
women gain access to the same educational opportunities as their male
112
counterparts. Title IX states, "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . " 113
There was uncertainty regarding whether Title IX was intended to
cover sexual harassment 114 until the late 1990s when the Supreme
Court decided that Title IX covered teacher-on-student sexual harass115
ment in Gebser and student-on-student harassment in Davis. 116

111

Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 98, at 91-92 (surveying over 1,300 adolescent Internet-users, with 31.9% adolescents experiencing repercussions of victimization from cyberbullying at school and 26.5% adolescents experiencing repercussions
of victimization from cyberbullying at home).
112
See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1975) ("[T]itle IX ... is designed to eliminate ...
discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."); Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages:
Does Title IX or the First Amendment Apply?, 43 ARiz. L. REV. 905, 916 (2001).
113
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
114
See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 664 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When Title IX was enacted in 1972, the
concept of 'sexual harassment' as gender discrimination had not been recognized or
considered by the courts.").
115
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) ("[A]
school district can be held liable in damages in cases involving a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student .... ").
116
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (holding
schools "liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment").
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In Gebser, the Court laid out a two-part standard for analyzing
school liability under Title IX: a) an official with authority to address
the problem must have actual knowledge of the harassment; 117 and b)
the official must fail to adequately respond, either with "deliberate
indifference" or by making an official decision not to correct the violation. 118 In Gebser, an eighth grade student claimed her male teacher
made sexually suggestive comments to her, 119 fondled her breasts, and
engaged in sexual intercourse with her. 120 The Court refused to find
the school liable under Title IX for sexual harassment because the
school did not have actual knowledge of the teacher's sexual remarks
and acts with the student. 121
Instead of teacher-on-student sexual harassment, Davis involved
student-on-student harassment. 122 Davis, a fifth grade girl, was subjected to continual verbal and physical harassment by a classmate who
repeatedly attempted to rub her genital area and breasts and said, "I
want to feel your boobs," or "I want to get in bed with you." 123 Davis's mother complained to the school, but the school took no action
to stop the harassment. 124 Subsequently, Davis's mother sued the
school district under Title IX for having allowed the known harassment to continue. 125
The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Davis's
claim on the ground that student-on-student harassment does not provide a private cause of action under the statute. 126 In reversing the
Eleventh Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court explained that although the harasser could not be held liable under Title IX, an entity
receiving federal funds could be liable under Title IX for its own misconduct. 127 Thus, a school district's failure to respond to student-onstudent harassment in its schools may give rise to a private suit for
money damages under Title IX. 128 The Court reasoned, "[h]aving previously determined that 'sexual harassment' is 'discrimination' in the
school context under Title IX, we are constrained to conclude that
student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can like117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Gesber, 524 U.S. at 290.
Id.
Id.at277-78.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 291-93.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 635-36.
Id.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 640.

HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

[Vol. 3:2]

283

wise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute." 129
The Court suggested that it was possible the school created a hostile
environment for Davis by failing to take disciplinary actions against
the student harasser. 130 However, "[public schools] are properly held
liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment . . . ." 131
In Davis, the Court defined sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination similar to Title VIL The Court cited a Title VII hostile
work environment case while outlining the standard for sexual harassment among students: "a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment
of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and
that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an
institution's resources and opportunities." 132 The Court cited yet another Title VII hostile work environment case to explain: "[w]hether
gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable 'harassment'
thus 'depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships."' 133
Yet, a student can be cyberbullied for many reasons beyond the
protected classes embodied in Title VII and Title IX. To effectively
address the wide array of cyberbullying abuse, this proposed test must
reach beyond the factual scenarios that fall under Title VII and Title
IX. Moreover, it is harder to prove· a claim of student-on-student harassment than a claim of teacher-on-student harassment under Title
134
IX. This offers yet another example of why the stringent standard in
Title IX, which requires "deliberate indifference to sexual harassment," would often fall short of protecting students from cyberbullying.135

129

Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
Id. at 639 ("The complaint alleges that LaShonda had suffered during the
months of harassment," which manifested in the form of a drop in grades and even the
discovery of a purported "suicide note.").
131
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
132
Id. at 651 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)).
133
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998)). See also Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (noting that whether conduct constitutes
harassment depends on several factors, "including, but not limited to, the ages of the
harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.").
134
Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (''Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to
[qualify as a breach of Title IX] than is teacher-student harassment.").
135
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. See also Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49 (explaining
that schools are not required to "remedy" peer harassment, but "must merely respond
to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.").
130
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V. APPLYING THE FOUR FACTORS FROM A HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENT TO A HOSTILE EDUCATION
ENVIRONMENT
To extend protection to student cyberbullying victims, this Note
proposes a test that employs Title VII' s hostile work environment
analysis using a sliding scale approach. The proposed test advances
and modernizes the existing student free-speech analysis in order to
provide better guidance to schools and courts when analyzing cyber
speech. Unlike the Tinker tetralogy, this test is specifically designed
for only one classification of speech: cyber speech. 136 This Note treats
all cyber speech as occurring off-campus because it is impractical for
schools to determine whether cyber speech occurs during school or a
. . 137
sch oo1-sponsored activity.
Cyberbullying cases are fact-intensive inquiries and thus a brightline test will prove unworkable. 138 A multifactor analysis is more appropriate. The following four factors, which are borrowed from hostile work environment law, will aid schools and courts in determining
whether or not a student's cyber speech rises to the level of cyberbullying: a) pervasiveness; b) severity; c) unwelcomeness; and d) interference with the educational environment.
This four-factor test employs objective and subjective analysis.
The first two factors involve an objective inquiry: namely, whether a
reasonable person would consider the harassment to be severe or pervasive. The third and fourth factors are subjective and look to whether
the plaintiff was actually offended and affected. 139 This objectivesubjective standard takes a "middle path between making actionable
any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury." 140 The objective factors elimi-

136

This test only covers speech communicated through the Internet. Yet,
cyber speech could take numerous forms, including text, video, images, audio, or a
combination thereof.
137
Students can access portable cell phones, iPads, or laptops during any hour
of the day. A student can access the Internet at the school computer lab or school
library. It would be unduly burdensome to pinpoint an alleged cyber bully's exact
location on a given day or hour to determine whether he was at school or participating
in a school-sponsored activity at the time the cyber speech posted on the Internet.
138
Consider the repercussions of an offensive "tweet" that is published to
hundreds of people, to the same post in a small Facebook group that's accessible to
only 10-15 people, to the same post sent as a private message between two people.
139
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that where
an environment "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive," a Title VII claim is potentially available) (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 21.

HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

285

nate eggshell plaintiffs, while the subjective factors ensure that each
plaintiff was actually affected by the online abuse.
A. Objective Factors: Pervasiveness and Severity Factors
Applied to School Settings.
1. Pervasiveness
The pervasiveness factor requires schools to consider the frequency of the offensive speech. The more frequent the speech, the more
likely it is to be sanctionable. Unlike most Title VII claims, which are
based on discrete acts of discrimination, a hostile work environment
claim is based on the cumulative effect of several acts. 141
Similarly, a single comment may not be enough for school officials to intervene. However, if the same or similar statements are
made numerous times and, consequently, invade the victim's educational environment, it may require school intervention. For example,
Sam writes on Alex's Facebook wall, "you're such a tool." That single statement may not rise to the level of requiring school intervention. Yet if Sam habitually calls Alex a "dumbass," "moron," or ')erk"
through various channels of social networking, the school may have to
take action to prohibit Sam's speech.
2. Severity
a. Threat of Physical Harm
In addition to judging the pervasiveness of the speech, this test also requires that a school or court look at the severity of the cyber conduct. In order to gauge the level of severity of another's speech, it
must be determined if the speech is "physically threatening or humiliating." 142
The school is always permitted to intervene if there is a threat of
physical violence. A threat of violence is sanctionable per se, as
speech that inherently alters a student's learning conditions. A physical threat of violence should be fairly easy to recognize, but there is
always a risk the recipient may mistake a joke or sarcastic comment as
141

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) ("A
hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.") (citation omitted).
142
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). See also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (noting that "male-onmale horseplay" is beyond the purview of Title VII).
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a physical threat. 143 One of the problematic issues surrounding cyber
speech is that it often precludes the recipient from hearing the intonation in the speaker's voice or from observing the speaker's non-verbal
cues. This increases the risk of misinterpreting the speaker's intended
message. This Note's proposed test addresses that concern by requiring an objective analysis. This prevents an innocuous statement from
being perceived as a physical threat because the test requires that a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have interpreted
the speech as a physical threat.
b. Discriminatory Speech
"[N]o single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of [a]
racial epithet .... " 144 Similarly, discriminatory speech based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin alters students' learning conditions and is considered highly severe; thus, such speech will almost
always require school officials to interfere. 145 "[Public schools] must
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovemment in the community and the nation." 146 Children must learn
that discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin is not tolerated by society.
Keep in mind that the speech must be directed at an identifiable
person or group in order to satisfy the proposed test's objective and
subjective elements. Moreover, context matters. For example, if a
Caucasian student makes a general· racial slur about blacks and there
are only four African American students in the class, then a reasonable person might conclude that the racial slur was targeting the African American students. Yet if an African American student makes a
143
For example, people often use the expression, "I am going to kill you"
very loosely in order to communicate their innocent frustration, sarcasm, or humor.
144
Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir.
1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78
Stat. 255 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2012)). Although Title VII does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation, this Note
includes sexual orientation discrimination, as well as discrimination based on disability, in the category of highly severe speech. Given recent incidents of cyberbullying
targeting homosexual students, schools ought to provide sensitivity to the subject by
categorizing it as per se severe speech. See supra notes 18-20, and accompanying
text. Furthermore, we may adopt the same disability discrimination principles from
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101-12213 (West
2011).
146
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
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racial slur about blacks, then the speech is more ambiguous because
the speaker is targeting his own race. A reasonable person might conclude the second statement is not as severe under the circumstances.
c.

Humiliation

If the speech does not rise to the level of a physical threat or prohibited discrimination, the school or court should next determine
whether the speech is "humiliating" so as to satisfy the severity prong.
Whether speech is humiliating turns on the content of the speech and
the manner in which it is communicated. If the speech deals with very
sensitive or private information, 147 schools and courts should view the
speech as more severe because the revelation of private information
has great potential for humiliation. Likewise, if the speaker decides to
broadcast or write an offensive remark in a public forum, that speech
could be more humiliating for the victim than if it was only communicated to a few individuals.
Speech is objectively severe if a reasonable person would understand it to be "vulgar," "lewd," or if the character of the speech is
"plainly offensive." 148 Swear words, vulgarities, and sexually explicit
speech like the speech in Fraser would qualify as more severe speech.
Similar to an employee who complains about a coworker's harassment, ·a student who directly complains to a school official about
cyberbullying is demonstrating that the bully's speech is negatively
interfering with his or her educational environment. Additional evidence may include a drop in grades due to distractions caused by
cyberbullying, decreased attendance due to the fear of violence or
humiliation, or feelings of anxiety and depression that interfere with
the victim's learning. 149

147

E.g. supra notes 18-25, and accompanying text. Tyler Clementi's private
relations with another male student were broadcasted on the Internet.
148
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's
speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students - indeed to any mature
person.").
149
The victim's friends and family may also provide corroborative testimony
about the victim's experiences. Importantly, the subjective element of this test is more
likely to be satisfied if a student can show a bully's cyber speech negatively affected
his or her learning environment in school.
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B. Subjective Factors: the Unwelcome Factor and Interference Factor Applied to School Settings.
1. Unwelcome Speech
Sexual conduct becomes unlawful within the hostile work environment context only when it is unwelcome. 150 The challenged conduct must be unwelcome "in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct
as undesirable or offensive." 151

289

fected by a cyberbully' s speech. 153 A parent may inform the school
that their child was sobbing after encountering cyberbullying. A
teacher may notify the school that the victim has not been attending
class, while a friend may explain that the victim was cutting that particular class in order to avoid the cyberbully. A school counselor may
describe how distraught the student was while discussing the cyberbullying incident. 154 It should be noted that because this factor is subjective and focuses on the victim, a cyberbully's insistence that he or
she was only joking and meant no harm·is entirely irrelevant. 155

b. The Victim's Prior Playful Joking
a. The Cyberbully's Playful Joking
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
acknowledges that sexual attraction may often play a role in day-today social exchanges between employees, stating that '"the distinction
between invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated, and
flatly rejected' sexual advances may well be difficult to discem." 152
Similarly, it may be difficult to decipher when speech amongst students is unwelcome because students often joke around in an innocent
playful manner. What appears to be a joke may be unwelcome by the
recipient. This is just one example illustrating that the inquiry is extremely fact-intensive and requires a flexible test.
In determining whether the speech was unwelcome, a victim's
admission is preferred, but there may also be strong circumstantial
evidence of unwelcomeness from friends, teachers, parents, and counselors. Some victims may be too embarrassed to admit they were af-

In hostile work environment law, the victim's "[o]ccasional use of
sexually explicit language does not necessarily negate a claim that the
sexual conduct was unwelcome." 156 The EEOC explains, "[a]lthough
a charging party's use of sexual terms or off-color jokes may suggest
that sexual comments by others in that situation were not unwelcome,
more extreme and abusive or persistent comments [may] not be excused."157 Thus, a plaintiffs "use of foul language or sexual innuendo
in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections against
unwelcome harassment."' 158
For the same reasons, a student victim's use of foul language or
horseplay has little probative value and does not necessarily detract
from the possibility that the harassment directed at the victim was
unwelcome speech. This invites the question: what if two students are
harassing each other and creating a hostile educational environment
for one another? School officials should treat these as two distinct
153

150
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (requiring unwelcomeness analysis); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (2011) (referring to
"[u ]nwelcome sexual advances"); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
EEOC No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC.
(1994), 1994 WL 1747814, at *5 ("It is well-settled that a charging party's claim will
fail if the allegedly offensive conduct is found to be 'welcome."').
151
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC No. 915.002,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814,
at *6; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *4 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
152
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *4 (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561F.2d983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacK.innon, J.,
concurring)); 29 C,F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012) (recommending a review of the "totality
of the circumstances").

A social outcast may feel even more isolated and upset after admitting the
speech deeply affected him or her.
154
Schools must do their best to avoid misattributing the student's behavior
as responses to cyberbullying when the behavior may be the result of outside factors.
The school will have greater assurance that the negative behavior is an indicator of
cyberbullying if the behavior is proximate to a potential cyberbullying encounter.
Negative behavior that occurs days after a victim discovers the cyberbully's speech
should not necessarily be construed as a reaction to the speech.
155
The cyberbully's joking behavior only matters ifthe victim welcomed the
speech as a joke. School officials may consider the ostensibly joking behavior during
the objective portion of this test, where schools must determine whether a reasonable
person would find the ''joke" to be severe or pervasive harassment.
156
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *6.
157 Id.
158

Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Katz
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)).

288

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

[Vol. 3:2]

B. Subjective Factors: the Unwelcome Factor and Interference Factor Applied to School Settings.
1. Unwelcome Speech
Sexual conduct becomes unlawful within the hostile work environment context only when it is unwelcome. 150 The challenged conduct must be unwelcome "in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct
as undesirable or offensive." 151

289

fected by a cyberbully' s speech. 153 A parent may inform the school
that their child was sobbing after encountering cyberbullying. A
teacher may notify the school that the victim has not been attending
class, while a friend may explain that the victim was cutting that particular class in order to avoid the cyberbully. A school counselor may
describe how distraught the student was while discussing the cyberbullying incident. 154 It should be noted that because this factor is subjective and focuses on the victim, a cyberbully's insistence that he or
she was only joking and meant no harm is entirely irrelevant. 155
b. The Victim's Prior Playful Joking

a. The Cyberbully's Playful Joking
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
acknowledges that sexual attraction may often play a role in day-today social exchanges between employees, stating that "'the distinction
between invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated, and
flatly rejected' sexual advances may well be difficult to discern." 152
Similarly, it may be difficult to decipher when speech amongst students is unwelcome because students often joke around in an innocent
playful manner. What appears to be a joke may be unwelcome by the
recipient. This is just one example illustrating that the inquiry is extremely fact-intensive and requires a flexible test.
In determining whether the speech was unwelcome, a victim's
admission is preferred, but there may also be strong circumstantial
evidence of unwelcomeness from friends, teachers, parents, and counselors. Some victims may be too embarrassed to admit they were af-

In hostile work environment law, the victim's "[o]ccasional use of
sexually explicit language does not necessarily negate a claim that the
sexual conduct was unwelcome." 156 The EEOC explains, "[a]lthough
a charging party's use of sexual terms or off-color jokes may suggest
that sexual comments by others in that situation were not unwelcome,
more extreme and abusive or persistent comments [may] not be excused."157 Thus, a plaintiffs "use of foul language or sexual innuendo
in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections against
unwelcome harassment."' 158
For the same reasons, a student victim's use of foul language or
horseplay has little probative value and does not necessarily detract
from the possibility that the harassment directed at the victim was
unwelcome speech. This invites the question: what if two students are
harassing each other and creating a hostile educational environment
for one another? School officials should treat these as two distinct
153

150
See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (requiring unwelcomeness analysis); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (2011) (referring to
"[u ]nwelcome sexual advances"); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
EEOC No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC.
(1994), 1994 WL 1747814, at *5 ("It is well-settled that a charging party's claim will
fail if the allegedly offensive conduct is found to be 'welcome."').
151
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC No. 915.002,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814,
at *6; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *4 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (I Ith Cir. 1982)).
152
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY. COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
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Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Katz
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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occurrences of bullying and two separate hostile environments. In
other words, hostile cyber speech between two parties that is severe or
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of each party's educational
environment does not diminish the school's right to intervene and
limit both parties' speech. 159
Notably, this approach does not excuse a student who goes overboard in standing up for herself. For example, suppose Josh constantly
bullies George on his Facebook page. George finally works up the
courage to respond to Josh on Facebook, but he unleashes so much
built-up anger that he makes a severe threat. George's actions may be
subject to school sanctions under this test just as Josh's incessant bullying of George may be cause for the school to intervene. George's
status as the first victim does not insulate him from being classified as
a cyberbully. This approach ensures fair and consistent treatment of
all parties involved. This policy encourages conflict resolution when
responding to a student's offensive speech, and it helps to prevent one
student's cyberbullying from escalating into a nasty brawl over the
Internet. To avoid these types of cases, schools need to educate students about how to properly respond to cyberbullying. 160

291

Furthermore, the EEOC recognizes that fear may explain a delay
in opposing or reporting the conduct. 164 If the victim failed to promptly complain, the investigator must ascertain why and determine
whether the victim's conduct is consistent with his or her allegations. 165 Moreover, the significance of whether the victim complained
contemporaneously varies depending upon "the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 166
When confronted with conflicting evidence as to welcomeness, the
EEOC looks at "the record as a whole and the totality of circumstances," and evaluates each situation on a case-by-case basis. 167
Similarly, students may more easily demonstrate that the speech
was unwelcome if they make a contemporaneous complaint about it to
school officials while the harassment is ongoing or shortly after it has
ceased. 168 Like an employee who is afraid to report harassment, a student may choose not to inform school officials about the bullying because he or she is frightened the bully might retaliate. 169 Similar to the
employment context, the failure to report a cyberbullying incident
does not destroy the student's assertion that the bully's conduct was
unwelcome. A contemporaneous complaint to school officials merely
strengthens the student's claim that the speech was unwelcome.

c. Reporting the Incident
2. Interference with the Victim's Education
According to hostile work environment law, the charging party's
claim will be considerably strengthened if there is a contemporaneous
complaint or protest. 161 For a complaint to be "contemporaneous," it
should be made while the harassment is ongoing or shortly after it has
ceased. 162 However, "[w]hile a complaint or protest is helpful to a
charging party's case, it is not a necessary element of the claim." 163

In order to support a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII, the harassment must unreasonably interfere with the employee's
164
165
166

Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(b) (2012)).
Id. at *5 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012)).
168
Interestingly, a student enduring harassment on Facebook has the option to
"report" the conduct to Facebook. A student may support her position that the speech
was unwelcome by demonstrating to the school that he or she reported it on Facebook. Facebook officials have the discretion to remove the bully from Facebook by
deleting her Facebook page and denying the bully the ability to register again with the
same email address. Nonetheless, the bully may register under another email address
and create another page. The victim may still be frightened that the bully will retaliate
with more severe and pervasive bullying once the bully loses her Facebook account.
See Safety Center, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/teens/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (instructing teens how to report abusive content on Facebook).
169
One study "found that almost one-third (32%) of cyberbullying victims
removed themselves from the online venue in which the cyberbullying occurred,
while one in five (20%) felt forced to stay offline completely for a period of time ....
While most cyberbullying victims were comfortable talking about their victimization
to a friend (56.6%), fewer than 9% of victims informed a teacher or an adult." Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 98, at 95 (citation omitted).
167

159

Given that each party acted as a cyberbully and a victim, school officials
may consider mandating group counseling between the parties rather than punishing
them both. Yet, if each party exhibited very severe and pervasive cyberbullying, then
the school may consider punishing both students.
160
School officials must make it clear that being a victim of cyberbullying
does not give you the right to cyberbully someone else. Yet students will only understand they will be held accountable for inappropriate responses to cyberbullying if
schools incorporate these policies into their rules, handbook definition of cyberbullying, and classroom curriculum.
161
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *5 ("When there is some indication of welcomeness or when the credibility of the
parties is at issue, the charging party's claim will be considerably strengthened if she
made a contemporaneous complaint or protest.").
162
Id. at *5 n.7.
163
Id. at *5.

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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work performance. 170 Hostile work environment law only forbids behavior that is so offensive that it alters the conditions of the victim's
employment. 171 Similarly, under the Title IX analysis, "a plaintiff
must establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts
from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are
effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities." 172
Under this test, the cyberbullying must also interfere with the victim's educational environment. In other words, the cyber speech must
be so severe and pervasive that it actually altered the student's learning conditions or greatly undermines the victim's educational experience.173
The most obvious example is physical exclusion: a victim who
endures such severe and pervasive cyberbullying that it physically
deprives the victim of access to school facilities or resources. 174 Consider a student who receives so many constant threats in the form of
text messages, emails, and Facebook posts that he feels completely
immobilized by fear and becomes too scared to attend class or eat
lunch in the school cafeteria. 175 Other examples of interference with a
student's educational environment include: a drop in grades; the inability to learn or complete assignments due to severe anxiety associated with the cyberbullying; the inability to work with peers because of
their involvement in the cyberbullying; skipping sports practice for
fear of confronting the bullies in the locker room; not participating in
class discussions because the student fears harassment or humiliation;
or retaliation due to the victim'·s reporting of cyberbullying to school
officials.
It is not difficult to satisfy this factor, since most cyberbullying
will likely pose some sort of distraction at school. Some disruptions
170
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). This interference requirement is similar to Tinker's substantial and material interference test. See
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). However,
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Id. at 650.
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are more serious than others. Schools must weigh the seriousness of
the interference with the other factors to determine whether or not
they should intervene. A highly severe and pervasive account of
cyberbullying coupled with a victim who only experiences minor distractions at school may still warrant the school's prohibition of the
cyberbully' s speech. Practically speaking, school officials may be
more inclined to limit a student's speech and protect a victim if there
is a serious interference with the victim's education-e.g. the victim
missed school for a week. Nevertheless, the objective factors of this
test prevent schools from limiting a student's cyber speech based solely on the complaints of an oversensitive child. A school may never
limit a student's cyber speech without some level of both severity and
pervasiveness.
VI. HOW THE TEST OPERATES
A. Knowledge Triggers the School's Duty to Protect the Student Victim
As discussed above, this test serves as a tool to identify when
school officials are able to sanction a cyberbully for his or her cyber
speech. The school must have some knowledge of the incident before
it is responsible for taking action to limit the cyberbully' s speech. The
school's knowledge, however, need not come from the victim. School
officials may learn about the incident through another student, a parent, friend, teacher, or guidance counselor. Once the school has
knowledge of the alleged cyberbullying, the school has the duty to
investigate the incident and, if necessary, take action to protect the
victim. This does not mean that the school must automatically suspend or otherwise punish the cyberbully. While sanctions are certainly
one way of protecting the victim, school counselors ought to employ
mediation and conflict resolution to prevent further cyberbullying.
B. This Test Operates Like a Sliding Scale
When confronted with a hostile work environment charge, courts
and· EEOC investigators look at the record as a whole and the totality
of circumstances, evaluating each situation on a case-by-case basis. 176
176

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) ("[W]hether an
environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012);
); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC No. 915.002,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., INC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814,
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The Court explained that this approach is not, and by its nature cannot
be, a mathematically precise test. 177 It is a flexible standard that operates like a sliding scale. 178 For example, the required level of severity
"varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct." 179 Each of the four factors, however, must be met. If appropriate under the circumstances, weak evidence of one element may be
offset by particularly strong evidence of another.
180
Similarly, school officials should use these four factors like a
sliding scale to gauge their ability to intervene and restrict a student's
speech. The school should look to the totality of the circumstances to
ensure that all four factors of this Note's proposed test are satisfied.
For example, if the speech is very severe and very pervasive, but the
attempted victim remains unaffected, there are no grounds for the
school to intervene and sanction the cyberbully.
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Upon investigating the incident, school officials discover that
Lindsey sent Amy three text messages the same evening saying,
"Moo!" School officials also find out that Amy experienced harassment at school the next day as everyone was yelling "Moo" at her in
the hallways in between classes and during lunch. Amy's friend later
reported that she had not seen Amy at their lunch table in almost a
week. School officials meet with Amy and she explains that she has
been hiding in the bathroom in order to avoid confronting Lindsey and
other harassers in the lunchroom. She also explains that she has been
so fraught with shame and humiliation about Lindsey's words that she
has become more self-conscious about her weight and recently
stopped eating lunch. Amy continues to explain that it has been hard
for her to pay attention in class because she gets very hungry from not
eating lunch and because she is nervous people will "Moo" during
class.

C. Application
1) Pervasiveness
To illustrate how the proposed test operates, recall the hypotheticals presented at the outset of this Note. Lindsey, a high school sophomore, logs onto her Facebook page from home. Stressed from a long
day at school, Lindsey updates her status and writes, "Amy is a fat
cow. Don't ever talk to her again, just tell her MOO." Katie is a fourteen year-old eighth grade student at the same school who decides to
update her Facebook status after school hours and writes, "In case you
didn't already know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to
hell." Is Lindsey's or Katie's speech protected by the First Amendment? Or, may school officials punish them for their cyber speech?
Example 1: Lindsey says, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever talk to
that cow, just tell her MOO."

Less Pervasive

Cyberbullying)

Lindsey's speech is objectively pervasive because she posted it on
her Facebook wall, where all of her friends (and Amy) could view the
speech. Note that the speech would be considered less pervasive if
Lindsey communicated it privately rather than in a public forum. Additionally, it is considered even more pervasive because the speech
was repeated in three subsequent text messages.
2) Severity
Less Severe

at *4 (instructing investigators to examine, among other things, the nature of the
conduct, whether it was verbal or physical, the context in which it was physically
threatening or humiliating, whether it was unwelcome, and whether it unreasonably
interfered with an employee's work performance).
177
Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
178
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701,
at *9-10 (explaining that the more severe the harassment is, the less need there is to
show the harassment was frequent).
179
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
180
The factors are: a) pervasiveness; b) severity; c) unwelcomeness; and d)
interference with the educational environment.

Pervasive (Potential

More Severe (Potential Cyberbullying)

Lindsey's speech is objectively severe because it is a form of humiliation directed at a physical characteristic of Amy: her weight.
School officials should consider cyber speech about physical characteristics that carry a public stigma as more severe. In particular, body
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weight is objectively severe due to the fact that eating disorders are
most likely to develop during the teenage years. 181
The speech would be considered more severe if it included a
threat of physical harm, discrimination, or vulgarities such as swear
words or inappropriate sexual innuendos. Even without those, however, Lindsey's speech is sufficiently severe, especially considering it
incited other students to harass Amy.
3) Unwelcomeness
Welcome

Unwelcome (Potential Cyberbullying)

Here, Amy averred to school officials that Lindsey's speech was
unwelcome. Even if she had not, however, the circumstantial evidence
of unwelcomeness is very strong. Amy stopped eating lunch· and hid
in the bathroom during her break. Amy's friend's statements further
corroborate Amy's emotional distress.
4) Interference in the victim's educational environment
No Interference
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[Vol. 3:2]

Interference (Potential Cyberbullying)

Lindsey's speech altered Amy's educational environment. Amy
complained of an inability to focus in class due to extreme anxiety.
Moreover, Amy experienced physical exclusion as she was unable to
walk around school or eat lunch for fear of her classmates teasing her.
All four factors strongly support the creation of a hostile learning
environment. In this example, Lindsey's speech rises to the level of
cyberbullying, which triggers the school's duty to intervene and restrict Lindsey's speech in order to protect Amy. Accordingly, school

officials may sanction Lindsey for her cyber speech without violating
Lindsay's First Amendment rights. 182
Example 2: Katie says, "In case you didn't already know it, I'm
the S*#%. Everyone else should go to helL"
In contrast to Example 1, Katie's cyber speech does not rise to the
level of cyberbullying. Katie's speech is offensive due to her use of
obscenities, yet it is not sufficiently severe because it does not discriminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, gender, national origin,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The lack of either a threat of physical
harm, sexual harassment, or use of inappropriate sexual innuendos
further illustrates that Katie's speech is not objectively severe.
The pervasive nature of Katie's speech creates a stronger case for
cyberbullying. Katie's speech is pervasive because it was on her Facebook wall for the general public to view. The facts here assume that
Katie does not have restrictive privacy settings applied to her account,
which may confine her speech to a smaller number of people. Such
privacy settings would reduce the pervasiveness of her speech.
Despite Katie's pervasive use of obscenities, the school cannot
sanction Katie because her speech did not target any particular person
or group. 183 Katie directed her speech at everyone in general but nobody in particular. Without an identifiable victim, there is simply no
evidence to substantiate the subjective factors of unwelcomeness and
interference. Under these facts, it is improper for the school to sanction Katie for cyberbullying.
While schools have a duty to protect students and promote values
of civility, 184 it is not the role of school officials to police every obscene phrase that students utter online. 185 Without an identifiable victim, there can be no subjective interference with anyone's learning
environment. Consequently, the school may not interfere.
Instead, if Katie had stated, "In case you didn't already know it,
I'm the S*#%. All the other cheerleaders should go to hell," then the
school officials should proceed with an analysis under the test proposed by this Note, the difference being that now Katie's speech is
182

181

H. W. Hoek, Incidence, prevalence and mortality ofanorexia and other
eating disorders. 19 CURRENTOPINIONINPSYCIDATRY, 389-394 (2007) (Among
young women, the prevalence of anorexia and bulimia is estimated to be 0.3% and
1.0% respectively. Prevalence rates of anorexia and bulimia appear to increase during
the transition from adolescence to young adulthood.).
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If Lindsey sued the school district for violating her First Amendment
rights under these circumstances, the court would analyze Lindsey's claim under this
proposed four-factor test.
183
Of course, if the speech constituted a real threat directed at students, such
as the possibility of a school shooting, then it would warrant the intervention of
school officials.
184
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
185
Even though school officials may not punish Katie, they may reach out to
her by offering her an opportunity to speak with a school guidance counselor.
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directed toward an identifiable group of victims: cheerleaders. Even
though the speech is targeted at a group of students, the speech must
be unwelcome and interfere with at least one individual out of such
group in order to constitute cyberbullying.
It bears repeating that school districts must carefully balance all
four factors of this proposed test. Indeed, the crux of this test is- the
requirement that schools weigh each factor equally. Only then can we
protect the victims of cyberbullying while upholding students' freedom of speech.
CONCLUSION
The four-factor sliding scale test proposed in this Note is a practical method for resolving the unique problem of cyberbullying facing
schools today. This test provides enough flexibility to apply to different scenarios within the ever-expanding social network scene, while
also ensuring consistent application within school communities and
lower courts. Furthermore, the test incorporates well-accepted and
well-defined principles from Title VII and Title IX while preserving
the policy underpinnings of the Tinker tetralogy.
Most importantly, this test is designed to protect the victim by
providing an avenue of recourse before the damage from cyberbullying becomes irreparable. Indeed, as the Harris Court made clear, "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." 186 The same is true of this proposed test. The cases
of Megan Meier and Tyler Clementi 187 are tragic reminders of what
can happen when a cyberbully' s psychological torment proceeds unchecked. This test serves as a preventive tool. It empowers students
and schools alike to take action before the victim becomes tomorrow's
next tragic headline.

186
187

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
See supra Part I.
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THE GRANTBACK CLAUSE IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
John M Murray*
"[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits,
and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded " 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, high technology has been a significant
driver of economic growth in the United States. 2 Businesses are increasingly turning to patented technology and innovation to streamline
operations, boost output, or reach new markets. 3 However, few firms
develop their own technology for internal use only, and technological
development frequently relies on the inventions of others. Rather,
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